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It is my hope that our initial efforts to create and establish this of-
fice will emulate the success of the U.S. Solicitor General’s Office 
and become a resource that the courts will come to respect and rely 
on for exceptional legal work and “to establish justice” on behalf of 
the people of the State of Florida. 
—Tom Warner, First Solicitor General of Florida1
I.   INTRODUCTION
 Although Florida’s Office of the Solicitor General was established 
only a decade ago, it has made the most of those ten years.2 This 
tenth anniversary benchmark provides a timely opportunity to reflect 
on the creation, development, and accomplishments of this unique of-
fice, which bears responsibility for advocating the interests of Florida 
and its citizens in a diverse array of appellate cases. 
                                                                                                                    
 * J.D., Florida State University, 2008. Law Clerk to the Honorable Bradford L. 
Thomas, Florida First District Court of Appeal. I greatly appreciate everyone who provided 
assistance with the research, writing, and editing of this Article. Specifically, I want to 
thank Sandy D’Alemberte, Bob Butterworth, Tom Warner, Chris Kise, and Scott Makar, 
all of whom graciously contributed to this Article through interviews and helpful sugges-
tions. Additionally, I would like to extend deeply felt thank-yous to Matt Conigliaro, who 
contributed greatly to the material in Part III.A, and Courtney Brewer, who provided 
much assistance with Part V.A. Lastly, I would like to recognize the individual without 
whom this Article would not have been written. During the Fall 2007 semester, an FSU 
law student was struggling to decide upon a topic for her class paper. Quickly recognizing 
that the student would never make up her mind, the professor promptly assigned her a 
topic about Florida’s Office of the Solicitor General. It was the most enjoyable class paper I 
ever worked on and has ultimately grown into this Article. Thank you, Professor Makar. 
 1. Tom Warner, Office of the Florida Solicitor General: The Greatest Job for a Lawyer 
in Florida, 75 FLA. B.J., July/Aug. 2001, at 32, 36. 
 2. Id. at 32; see also C.B. Upton, The Office of the Florida Solicitor General: An Ap-
pellate Lawyer’s Field of Dreams, THE RECORD, Fall-Winter 2009, at 14. 
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 This Article will look back on the first ten years of Florida’s Office 
of the Solicitor General. Part II will examine the creation of the posi-
tion and the role of the office. Next, Parts III, IV, and V will look at 
the tenures of Florida’s first three solicitors general. Then, this Ar-
ticle will propose in Part VI how the role of Florida’s solicitor general 
could be further developed and expanded. Part VII briefly concludes 
the Article. 
II.   FLORIDA’S OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
 Florida’s Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is still a relatively 
young creation, having been established ten years ago in July 1999 at 
the request of Florida’s then-Attorney General Robert “Bob” Butter-
worth.3 The Solicitor General has “plenary authority over all civil ap-
peals for the State of Florida.”4 This authority includes, subject to the 
authority of the Attorney General, (1) monitoring cases for potential 
appeals that will significantly affect the state’s interests; (2) deciding 
whether cases should be appealed in a state or federal court; and (3) 
determining whether the state will file or join an amicus brief in 
pending cases that implicate state interests.5 Any such amicus briefs 
are filed in the name of the Attorney General and the Solicitor Gen-
eral based on the Attorney General’s authority to speak on behalf of 
the state.6 Interestingly, the position has an additional role—that of 
educator. Florida’s Solicitor General concurrently holds the position 
of the Richard W. Ervin Eminent Scholar Chair at the Florida State 
University (FSU) College of Law. The position of solicitor general is 
undoubtedly an appellate lawyer’s dream and aptly has been called 
“the greatest job for a lawyer in the state of Florida.”7
 The first person to hold the position was Tom Warner, a former 
member of the Florida House of Representatives.8 His successor, 
Christopher Kise, was named in December 2002 by then-Attorney 
                                                                                                                    
 3. Id. In comparison, the position of U.S. Solicitor General was created in 1870, 
when the Department of Justice was established. Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, §1, 16 Stat. 
162. The Act directed that within the Department, there should be “an officer learned in 
the law, to assist the Attorney-General in the performance of his duties, to be called the so-
licitor-general.” Id. at § 2. 
 4. Warner, supra note 1, at 32. For a description of the types of courses that Florida’s 
Solicitor General has taught, see Office of the Attorney General of Florida, Solicitor Gener-
al, Richard W. Ervin Eminent Scholar Chair, http://myfloridalegal.com/pages.nsf/main/ 
8ac3c14443f4120285256cc6007a9be9!OpenDocument (last visited Oct. 27, 2009) [hereinaf-
ter Richard W. Ervin Chair Website]. 
 5. Warner, supra note 1, at 32-34. For a discussion of the OSG’s early amicus activi-
ty, see Sylvia H. Walbot & Joseph H. Lang, Jr., Amicus Briefs: Friend or Foe of Florida 
Courts, 32 STETSON L. REV. 269, 283-86 (2003). 
 6. See generally FLA. STAT. § 16.01(4)-(5) (2008). 
 7. Warner, supra note 1, at 36. Tom Warner, Florida’s first Solicitor General, made 
this declaration. 
 8. Id. at 32. 
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General Charlie Crist.9 Kise served in the position until July 2006, 
when he returned to private practice.10 His successor, Scott Makar, 
was appointed by Attorney General Bill McCollum in February 2007.11
A. From Concept to Creation 
 The OSG was brought to fruition mainly through the efforts of two 
men—Talbot “Sandy” D’Alemberte and Bob Butterworth.12
D’Alemberte served as Dean of the FSU College of Law from 1984 to 
1989 and President of FSU from 1993 to 2003.13 He first envisioned 
the creation of Florida’s Solicitor General in the 1980s when U.S. So-
licitor General Rex Lee visited Tallahassee to speak at the College of 
Law’s graduation ceremony.14 Years later, D’Alemberte discussed the 
idea with Attorney General Bob Butterworth.15
 Both men worked towards making the idea a reality. Funding for 
the position was a key hurdle to overcome; however, D’Alemberte and 
Butterworth devised a unique resolution. The Attorney General’s Of-
fice endowed proceeds from a consumer fraud settlement agreement 
to FSU; the state provided matching funds.16 As a result, the Richard 
W. Ervin Eminent Scholar Chair was created at the FSU College of 
                                                                                                                    
 9. Press Release, Attorney General-Elect Charlie Crist, Chris Kise Appointed Flori-
da Solicitor General (Dec. 16, 2002), available at http://myfloridalegal.com/newsrel.nsf/ 
newsreleases/0468ECF94829F26685256C91005765C0. 
 10. Press Release, Foley & Lardner, LLP, Florida Solicitor General Christopher Kise 
Joins Foley to Chair Firm’s National Appellate Practice (July 25, 2006) [hereinafter Foley 
Press Release], available at http://www.foley.com/news/news_detail.aspx?newsid=2276. 
 11. Press Release, Office of the Attorney General of Florida, McCollum Appoints Statewide 
Prosecutor, Solicitor General (Feb. 13, 2007) [hereinafter McCollum Press Release], available at
http://myfloridalegal.com/newsrel.nsf/newsreleases/0EB3CA6F00DC6AD2852572810064DC25.  
 12. Warner, supra note 1. 
 13. Florida State University College of Law, Faculty Profiles, Talbot “Sandy” 
D’Alemberte, http://www.law.fsu.edu/faculty/tdalemberte.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2009). 
 14. Interview with Talbot “Sandy” D’Alemberte, former President, FSU, in Tallahas-
see, Fla. (Apr. 1, 2009) [hereinafter D’Alemberte Interview] (interview notes on file with 
author). Rex Lee served as U.S. Solicitor General from 1981 to 1985. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Office of the Solicitor General, Rex Lee, http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/aboutosg/rexbio.html 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2009). At a national conference held soon after Lee’s death in 1996, 
Justice David Souter was asked about recent changes to advocacy before the U.S. Supreme 
Court. His response meaningfully described Lee’s service to the country in the role of  
solicitor general:  
Well, I can tell you that the biggest change by far is that Rex Lee is gone. Rex 
Lee was the best Solicitor General this nation has ever had, and he is the best 
lawyer this Justice ever heard plead a case in this Court. Rex Lee was born to 
argue tough cases of immense importance to this nation. He set new standards 
of excellence for generations of lawyers and justices. No one thing has hap-
pened to change the nature of advocacy of this Court which has had as much 
impact as the loss of that one player. 
Theodore B. Olson, Rex E. Lee Conference on the Office of the Solicitor General of the Unit-
ed States, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1. 
 15. D’Alemberte Interview, supra note 14. 
 16. Id.
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Law specifically for the Solicitor General.17 A portion of the Solicitor 
General’s salary is paid by the funds from the endowment; according-
ly, the Attorney General appoints the Solicitor General with the ad-
vice and approval of FSU.18
 In this role as the Richard W. Ervin Eminent Scholar Chair, the 
Solicitor General is an adjunct faculty member of FSU’s law school.19
Each fall and spring semester, the Solicitor General teaches a course 
to second- or third-year law students.20 Course topics have ranged 
from Appellate Advocacy to White Collar Crime.21 By tying the posi-
tion to FSU’s College of Law, D’Alemberte and Butterworth estab-
lished a lasting and beneficial relationship between the school and 
the Attorney General’s Office, under which students enjoy direct 
access to the state’s top appellate advocate.  
B. The Role and Procedure of the Office 
 Florida’s OSG is based on the theory that a unit within the Attor-
ney General’s Office should be devoted solely to appellate work in-
volving the state’s interests. By selecting cases to work on through 
careful analysis of the interests and legal questions at issue, the OSG 
keeps its caseload manageable and provides devoted attention to cases 
that significantly implicate Florida’s interests.22 In the words of Flori-
da’s first Solicitor General, Tom Warner, “[t]he concept . . . is to infuse 
private legal expertise and experience into government practice, to 
elevate the state’s appellate practice, and to provide coordination of 
both legal and policy issues in the state’s most important cases.”23
 The OSG monitors all new civil appellate cases opened in the At-
torney General’s Office.24 Through this monitoring system, the office 
can review cases for a variety of factors, including: potential state-
wide importance, the triggering of novel or complex legal issues, and 
general or specific effects upon issues of great public interest.25 With 
these factors in mind, the Solicitor General advises the Attorney 
                                                                                                                    
 17. Id.; see also Warner, supra note 1, at 32; Upton, supra note 2, at 14. 
 18. Warner, supra note 1, at 32. Notably, Attorney General McCollum recently con-
tributed an additional $275,000 to the endowment pursuant to a settlement agreement. 
Settlement Leads to Supplemental Funding for Law School Chair, FLORIDA STATE LAW
ALUMNI MAGAZINE, Spring 2009, at 21. 
 19. Id.; Upton, supra note 2, at 14.  
 20. The author of this Article was a student in Chris Kise’s fall 2006 Appellate Advo-
cacy class, Scott Makar’s fall 2007 course on Florida, the Constitution & Supreme Court, 
and Scott Makar’s spring 2008 class on Topics in Appellate Law.  
 21. Richard W. Ervin Chair Website, supra note 4; see also Upton, supra note 2, at 14-15. 
 22. See Warner, supra note 1, at 34 (discussing the monitoring process and factors 
used to determine if the Solicitor General’s office might wish to appear in a case or assist 
others with preparations). 
 23. Id. at 32. 
 24. Kise Interview, infra note 82; see also Warner, supra note 1, at 34-35. 
 25. Id.
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General on how certain cases may trigger legal or policy issues in 
which the state has an interest.26 Ultimately, the Solicitor General 
plays a vital role in deciding whether the state should appeal or be-
come involved with certain cases. Currently, in addition to the Solici-
tor General, the office is composed of a Chief Deputy Solicitor Gener-
al and four deputy solicitors general.27
 It is this role as advocate for Florida’s interests that introduced 
Tom Warner to the greatest job for an appellate lawyer in Florida, 
catapulted Chris Kise into the hallowed halls of One First Street, 
Washington D.C., thrice within an eighteen-month span, and ele-
vated Scott Makar to the head of what is appropriately described as 
one of the most high-powered public law firms in the state.  
III.   SOLICITOR GENERAL TOM WARNER AND THE GREATEST JOB
 In 1999, Representative Tom Warner was preparing for a new 
job—his time as a state legislator was coming to an end.28 The next 
stage of his professional career would prove to be unique. Attorney 
General Butterworth approached Warner to serve as Florida’s first 
Solicitor General.29 Warner was well-suited to assume such a role. 
His professional background as a lawyer, coupled with his experience 
as a state representative dealing with the wide-ranging public inter-
ests of the state and its citizens, would prove valuable.30
 Being the first person to hold a newly-created position had its 
challenges. Fortunately, Warner had resources from which to draw 
ideas in making the OSG a significant part of the Attorney General’s 
Office. Warner looked to other state solicitors general and the United 
States’ Solicitor General for ideas in establishing an office that would 
enhance the appellate practice of the Attorney General’s Office.31
 Importantly, Warner and Butterworth wanted to enhance the ap-
pellate work of the Attorney General’s Office.32 The position was 
broadly envisioned as a supervisory and coordinating role to ensure 
coherency and quality in the appellate efforts of the Attorney Gener-
al’s Office around the state.33 An initial challenge in defining the 
scope of the position was creating a workable system that would al-
                                                                                                                    
 26. Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability, Office of the 
Attorney General (Department of Legal Affairs): Constitutional Legal Services, http:// 
www.oppaga.state.fl.us/profiles/1030/right.asp?programnum=1030#Solicitor (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2009). 
 27. Upton, supra note 2, at 15. 
 28. Interview with Tom Warner, former Fla. Solicitor General, (Mar. 24, 2009) [herei-
nafter Warner Interview] (interview notes on file with author). 
 29. Id.
 30. Warner, supra note 1, at 32 n.a1. 
 31. Warner Interview, supra note 28. 
 32. Id.
 33. Id.
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low the OSG to function within and enhance the Attorney General’s 
Office.34 Specifically, Butterworth and Warner wanted to avoid dis-
rupting the already established divisions and units within the of-
fice.35 As a result, the Solicitor General was given authority over only 
civil appeals.36
 Warner remembers his time as solicitor general as an interesting 
and rewarding experience, not only due to his work in numerous cas-
es on behalf of the state of Florida, but also due to his role as an ad-
junct professor at the FSU College of Law.37 Warner would engage 
his students in the work of the OSG, often having them write re-
search memoranda on pending legal issues and hold moot court ar-
guments.38 As a result, the students were exposed to a variety of state 
and federal legal issues, as evidenced by the spectrum of notable cas-
es handled by the OSG during Warner’s tenure. 
A. Notable Cases Under Warner 
 Florida’s Solicitor General first appeared in rulemaking and other 
procedural cases39 as well as cases addressing the sufficiency of pro-
posed constitutional amendments.40 Among the constitutional 
amendment cases was Armstrong v. Harris, the only Florida Su-
preme Court decision to hold invalid a constitutional amendment ap-
proved by voters based on what the court subsequently found to be a 
misleading ballot summary.41
 In 2000, Solicitor General Warner represented the Attorney Gen-
eral in the original Bush v. Holmes appeal to the First District Court 
of Appeal.42 The appellants in that case contested a trial court’s rul-
ing that Florida’s recently created Opportunity Scholarship Program 
violated Article IX, section 1, of the Florida Constitution by providing 
students at failing public schools with tuition vouchers that could be 
used at private schools.43 The First District reversed the trial court’s 
ruling,44 but the case would continue on for many years, with both So-
                                                                                                                    
 34. Id.
 35. Id.
 36. Id.
 37. Id.
 38. Id.
 39. E.g., In re Amendments to Fla. Evidence Code, 782 So. 2d 339, 339 (Fla. 2000); 
Amendments to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, 3.852 and 3.993, 772 So. 2d 532, 532 (Fla. 2000). 
 40. E.g., Kainen v. Harris, 769 So. 2d 1029, 1030 (Fla. 2000) (denying relief in a man-
damus proceeding challenging the language of a ballot summary). 
 41. 773 So. 2d 7, 21-22 (Fla. 2000). 
 42. 767 So. 2d 668, 670 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), disapproved by Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 
2d 392 (Fla. 2006). 
 43. Bush, 767 So. 2d at 675-76. 
 44. Id. at 677. 
2009] OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL 225 
licitor General Warner and his successor, Chris Kise, becoming great-
ly involved with the litigation.45
 In 2001, the OSG entered the high-profile public records litigation 
surrounding the autopsy photographs of well-known racecar driver 
Dale Earnhardt.46 Earnhardt died in February 2001 in an accident 
during the annual Daytona 500 race.47 The local medical examiner 
conducted an autopsy as required by Florida law.48 A legal battle 
quickly ensued over whether the autopsy photographs and recordings 
were public records subject to general disclosure. Earnhardt’s survi-
vors filed suit to block disclosure of the materials, and the Legisla-
ture quickly passed a new law generally exempting autopsy photo-
graphs and recordings from public records disclosure.49 Various per-
sons intervened to challenge the new law and obtain the records, and 
the Solicitor General intervened to defend the law on behalf of the 
Attorney General and the State of Florida. A circuit court blocked 
disclosure of the records at issue and held the new law constitution-
al.50 The case proceeded to the Fifth District Court of Appeal, which 
likewise held the law constitutional.51 The Florida Supreme Court ul-
timately denied review.52
 In that same time period, Solicitor General Warner began what 
would become a regular and successful practice of appearing on be-
half of the State of Florida as an amicus curiae in state and federal 
litigation. Solicitor General Warner filed one of the first such amicus
briefs in Betts v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., a Fifth District Court of Ap-
peal case addressing a consumer suit against a check-cashing com-
pany for allegedly charging usurious interest rates on short-term 
loans.53 The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Attorney General, 
maintained that the transactions at issue were loans subject to Flori-
da’s usury laws.54 A divided Fifth District disagreed.55 Judge Griffin 
dissented with a written opinion in which she expressly agreed with 
the Attorney General’s position.56 Several years later, in another 
case, the Florida Supreme Court disapproved the Fifth District’s opi-
                                                                                                                    
 45. Bush, 919 So. 2d at 396. 
 46. Campus Commc’ns, Inc. v. Earnhardt, 821 So. 2d 388, 391-92 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). 
 47. Id. at 391. 
 48. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 406.11(1)(a) (2001). 
 49. Ch. 2001-1, Fla. Laws (2001) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 406.135 (2001)); Earnhardt 
v. Volusia County, No. 2001-30373-CICI, 2001 WL 992068, at *1-4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July  
10, 2001). 
 50. Volusia County, 2001 WL 992068, at *6. 
 51. Campus Commc’ns, Inc., 821 So. 2d at 403. 
 52. Campus Commc’ns, Inc. v. Earnhardt, 848 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 2003). 
 53. 827 So. 2d 294, 295-96 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), disapproved by McKenzie Check Ad-
vance, LLC v. Betts, 928 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 2006). 
 54. Betts, 827 So. 2d at 299 (Griffin, J., dissenting). 
 55. Id. at 297-99 (majority opinion). 
 56. Id. at 299 (Griffin, J., dissenting). 
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nion and embraced Judge Griffin’s dissent—the Attorney General’s 
position ultimately prevailed.57
 The Solicitor General’s amicus efforts soon extended to cases of 
national importance. One such matter was Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, a high-profile United States Supreme Court case that ad-
dressed whether Ohio’s public school tuition voucher program vi-
olated the Establishment Clause.58 The program allowed parents of 
students in failing schools to use publicly funded scholarships at par-
ticipating private schools, including religious private schools.59 Flori-
da had a significant interest in the case due to its own recently 
enacted Opportunity Scholarship Program. 
 The Sixth Circuit had declared Ohio’s program unconstitutional 
and emphasized the high percentage of Ohio voucher recipients who 
elected to use their vouchers at religious schools.60 Solicitor General 
Warner’s amicus brief asserted that such percentages should be irre-
levant because they are ultimately tied to how many private schools 
in a given area are religious.61 The brief developed this argument, in-
cluding statistical data involving Ohio, Florida, and other states.62
Six states joined the brief.63 The Supreme Court ultimately reversed 
the Sixth Circuit and ruled that Ohio’s program did not violate the 
Establishment Clause.64 The Court’s opinion twice cited the Solicitor 
General’s brief in support of the conclusion that religious school par-
ticipation rates in the case were constitutionally insignificant.65
 Another noteworthy case involving the OSG’s early amicus efforts 
was Shaw v. Murphy, in which the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed whether a prisoner has a First Amendment right to provide 
legal assistance to other prisoners, and also whether, based on con-
cerns about prison security and safety, states could limit the amount 
of communications and contact between inmates.66 Solicitor General 
Warner submitted an amicus brief on behalf of Florida and several 
other states.67 The brief was in the style of a “Brandeis brief”68—it 
                                                                                                                    
 57. McKenzie Check Advance, LLC, 928 So. 2d at 1210. 
 58. 536 U.S. 639, 643-44 (2002). 
 59. Id. at 644-45. 
 60. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 958-61 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 61. Brief for State of Florida et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at *13, 
Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (No. 00-1751). 
 62. Id. at *14-17. 
 63. See id.
 64. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 644. 
 65. Id. at 657-58. 
 66. 532 U.S. 223, 225, 228 (2001). 
 67. Brief for the State of Florida et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Shaw,
532 U.S. 223 (No. 99-1613). The other states included Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Illi-
nois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hamp-
shire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah, Vermont, and Commonwealth of Virginia. Id.
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provided the Court with information about how people were using 
prison “law clerks” to pass messages and objects to inmates in solita-
ry confinement.69 The brief even included evidence and pictures of the 
types of items being passed along.70 Notably, the Supreme Court cited 
Florida’s brief in its unanimous opinion,71 which held that prisoners 
do not have a First Amendment right to provide legal assistance.72
 In 2002, the OSG led another significant effort to support a fellow 
state in the United States Supreme Court. Washington State De-
partment of Social and Health Services v. Guardianship of Keffeler 
began as a low-profile class action suit in Washington state court 
against the state agency that provided care to foster children.73 The 
state supreme court held that the agency’s practice of using foster 
children’s federal benefits to pay foster care costs violated the Social 
Security Act’s anti-attachment provision.74 In light of that decision, 
the state agency would have been required to return to the state’s 
foster care children millions of dollars that had been expended on 
those children’s care. Washington requested review by the United 
States Supreme Court and sought amicus support at the certiorari 
stage to demonstrate the potential national impact of the state su-
preme court’s decision. 
 Solicitor General Warner and the OSG provided that much-needed 
support. Florida had a significant interest in the case on account of 
the tens of thousands of children in its own foster care system. The 
Solicitor General prepared an amicus brief on Florida’s behalf that 
twenty-five other states and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
joined, urging the Supreme Court to grant certiorari.75 The Supreme 
Court did so, and the Solicitor General later filed an amicus brief 
urging reversal on the merits.76 Thirty-eight states, the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico, and the Territories of the Virgin Islands and 
American Samoa joined that amicus merits brief.77 The Supreme 
                                                                                                                    
 68. A “Brandeis brief” provides more than just legal arguments or reasoning; it often 
will include policy arguments, scientific data, or other evidence to support its position and 
persuade the court. See Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 315, 340, 340 n.150 (2008). 
 69. Warner Interview, supra note 28. 
 70. Id.
 71. Shaw, 532 U.S. at 231. 
 72. Id. at 225. 
 73. 537 U.S. 371, 379 (2003). 
 74. Guardianship of Keffeler v. Wash. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 32 P.3d 267, 279 
(Wash. 2001), rev’d, 537 U.S. 371 (2003). 
 75. Brief for the State of Florida et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner’s Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari, Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. and Health Servs., 537 U.S. 371 (No. 
01-1420). 
 76. Brief for the State of Florida et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Wash. 
State Dep’t of Soc. and Health Servs., 537 U.S. 371 (No. 01-1420). 
 77. See id.
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Court ultimately reversed the Washington Supreme Court’s decision, 
again citing the amicus brief submitted by Florida.78
 The OSG appeared successfully in many other high-profile cases 
through the end of 2002, when Tom Warner stepped down as solicitor 
general. For instance, the Solicitor General defended the constitutio-
nality of Florida’s 1999 tort reform legislation in State v. Florida 
Consumer Action Network.79 The Solicitor General also defended the 
Legislature’s authority to regulate endangered and threatened spe-
cies of marine life, most particularly manatees and sea turtles, in Ca-
ribbean Conservation Corp., Inc. v. Florida Fish and Wildlife Conser-
vation Commission.80 Further, the Solicitor General intervened in 
Media General Convergence, Inc. v. Chief Judge of Thirteenth Judi-
cial Circuit to ensure that sexual harassment records received or 
generated by a circuit court chief judge concerning a fellow judge 
were considered public records.81
 Warner returned to private practice after his tenure as solicitor 
general. As demonstrated by the variety of cases handled under 
Warner, the fledgling office was establishing itself as an active and 
effective locus of appellate litigation involving state interests. The 
reputation of the office would continue to grow as a new solicitor gen-
eral, Chris Kise, arrived at the helm. 
IV.   SOLICITOR GENERAL CHRIS KISE GOES TO WASHINGTON
 He would not call it “lucky,” but the red and blue bowtie that 
Chris Kise is often seen wearing is what he wore to almost every oral 
argument as Florida’s solicitor general.82 It was also the source of 
some consternation the day before his first oral argument at the 
United States Supreme Court.83 Unsure if he could wear the bowtie 
during oral arguments at the formal high court, he travelled around 
Washington D.C. in a taxicab the evening before his argument look-
ing for a menswear shop to buy a traditional necktie.84 The next day, 
he arrived at the Court and learned that not only was it acceptable 
for him to wear his bowtie at oral argument, but that Justice Stevens 
himself wears bowties on the bench.85
                                                                                                                    
 78. Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. and Health Servs., 537 U.S. at 391-92. 
 79. 830 So. 2d 148, 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), rev. denied, 852 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 2003). 
 80. 838 So. 2d 492, 494 (Fla. 2003). 
 81. 840 So. 2d 1008, 1009-10 (Fla. 2003). 
 82. Interview with Chris Kise, Former Fla. Solicitor General, in Tallahassee, Fla. 
(Oct. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Kise Interview] (digital recording on file with author). 
 83. Id.
 84. Id.
 85. Id. Another interesting fact that Chris Kise learned the day of his first appear-
ance before the Supreme Court was that the Court maintains a wardrobe closet full of ties, 
shirts, suit jackets, and other such formal apparel in case counsel ever showed up for ar-
guments and had a wardrobe “emergency.” Id.
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 Chris Kise was only the second person to serve as Florida’s  
solicitor general, yet he played a significant role in further establish-
ing the OSG as a key part of any appellate litigation involving  
Florida’s interests. 
 Prior to holding the position, Kise had almost fifteen years of ap-
pellate experience.86 He served until July 2006, when he returned to 
private practice. After Charlie Crist was elected Governor of Florida 
in November 2006, he named Kise as Counsellor to the Governor.87
In November 2007, Kise again returned to private practice but  
remained the Special Advisor to the Governor on Energy and  
Climate Change.88
A. Notable Cases Under Kise 
 Under Kise, the OSG continued to be involved in a variety of cas-
es, most notably three cases involving federal habeas corpus claims, 
which Kise argued before the United States Supreme Court in an 
eighteen-month span. 
 It was not until April 2005, almost six years after the creation of 
the position, that Florida’s Solicitor General first appeared at oral 
arguments before the United States Supreme Court in Gonzalez v. 
Crosby.89 This first appearance was quickly followed by a second ap-
pearance in February 2006 (for Day v. McDonough)90 and a third ap-
pearance in October 2006 (for Lawrence v. Florida).91 Interestingly, 
all three cases involved questions relating to the application and in-
terpretation of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (AEDPA).92 AEDPA was legislation “[d]esigned to promote ‘com-
ity, finality, and federalism,’ ” and the statutory scheme “sought to 
extricate federal courts from a tangled, ‘tutelary relation’ with state 
courts.”93 Accordingly, as so often happens with comprehensive legis-
                                                                                                                    
 86. Id. Prior to being appointed Solicitor General, Chris Kise was a partner with the 
Gray Harris law firm in the Tampa office. Kise Named Solicitor General, FLA. BAR NEWS,
Jan. 1, 2003, available at http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/jnnews01.nsf/Articles/ 
23CAD2B9D9AC668A85256C98005A51D5. 
 87. Press Release, Florida Governor-Elect Charlie Crist, Christopher Kise Named Counsel-
lor [sic] to the Governor (Nov. 21, 2006), available at http://www.cristtransition.com/ 
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 88. Press Release, Florida Governor Charlie Crist, Governor Charlie Crist Announces 
Special Advisor on Energy and Climate Change (Nov. 2, 2007), available at
http://www.flgov.com/release/9606. 
 89. 545 U.S. 524, 525 (2005).  
 90. 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006). 
 91. 127 S. Ct. 1079 (2007). 
 92. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
8, 18, 22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 93. The Supreme Court, 2006 Term – Leading Cases: “Clearly Established Law” in 
Habeas Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 335, 335 (2007) (quoting Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 
330, 335 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
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lation affecting such broad issues, states became enmeshed in the in-
terpretation and application of specific provisions of the Act. Because 
state interests were implicated, Florida’s Solicitor General appeared 
in a line of cases involving AEDPA’s application.94
Gonzalez centered on AEDPA’s restrictions on “second or succes-
sive” habeas corpus petitions.95 Twelve years after beginning to serve 
a ninety-nine year sentence for one count of robbery with a firearm, 
Petitioner Gonzalez filed two unsuccessful postconviction motions for 
relief in state court.96 Three years later, Gonzalez filed a federal ha-
beas petition in U.S. District Court.97 This petition was dismissed 
under Eleventh Circuit precedent as barred by AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations,98 which provides a one-year limitation on the filing of “an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pur-
suant to the judgment of a State court.”99
 Approximately two years after Gonzalez’s federal habeas petition 
was dismissed, the United States Supreme Court held that “an appli-
cation for state postconviction relief can be ‘properly filed’ even if the 
state courts dismiss it as procedurally barred.”100 Several months af-
ter that ruling, Gonzalez filed a pro se motion invoking Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 60(b), which allows a court to provide relief from a 
final judgment under a limited set of circumstances including mis-
                                                                                                                    
 94. Solicitor General Kise and his office became involved in the cases through the Attor-
ney General’s Office. Kise Interview, supra note 82. The Attorney General’s Office represents 
the state in almost all criminal appeals and “systemic” appeals (appeals that involve the inter-
pretation of the structure and functioning of the criminal justice system; this category includes 
habeas appeals). Id. Mr. Kise noted that some state attorney’s offices in Florida are large 
enough to require a dedicated appellate staff to handle appeals. For the most part, however, 
the Attorney General’s Office works on the state’s criminal appeals. Id.; see also Office of the 
Attorney General of Florida, Criminal Appeals, http://myfloridalegal.com/pages.nsf/ 
4492d797dc0bd92f85256cb80055fb97/7295a759cf3fb5c985256cc600587a33 (last visited Oct. 
27, 2009). Since the three habeas cases were classified as collateral criminal instead of civ-
il, as the cases progressed through the appeals process, they were not tracked by the Solici-
tor General’s case monitoring system. The OSG did not become involved in the cases until 
the United States Supreme Court had already granted certiorari in them. Kise Interview, 
supra note 82. At that point, Solicitor General Kise, along with then-Attorney General 
Crist, had to decide a threshold question of which unit within the Attorney General’s Office 
would handle the case in the United States Supreme Court—the OSG, the criminal ap-
peals division, or a combination of both. Id. Ultimately, attorneys from both offices collabo-
rated on the briefs and preparation for Gonzalez and Day. See Brief of Respondent, Day v. 
McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006) (No. 04-1324); Brief of Respondent, Gonzalez v. Crosby, 
545 U.S. 524 (2005) (No. 04-6432). For Lawrence, the OSG played the primary role in pre-
paring the case. See Brief of Respondent, Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079 (2007) (No. 
05-8820). By the time Lawrence progressed to oral argument, Chris Kise had already re-
turned to private practice; however, he continued to work on the case and argued it before 
the United States Supreme Court. Kise Interview, supra note 82. 
 95. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2000). 
 96. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 526 (2005). 
 97. Id.
 98. Id. at 527. 
 99. § 2244(d)(1). 
 100. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 527 (citing Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000)). 
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take, fraud, and newly discovered evidence.101 The Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Gonzalez’s rule 60(b) 
motion as a second or successive habeas petition, which requires pre-
certification by the court of appeals before it can be filed under 
AEDPA.102 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the deni-
al of Gonzalez’s motion.103
 Florida Solicitor General Kise briefed and argued the case on be-
half of the Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections.104 In 
its decision, the Court ruled that the provisions of AEDPA are trig-
gered when a prisoner applies for a writ of habeas corpus.105 The 
Court determined that Gonzalez’s rule 60(b) motion was not a habeas 
petition since it did not advance a claim seeking relief on the merits 
from a state court conviction.106 Instead, Gonzalez’s motion alleged 
that the federal courts had misapplied AEDPA’s statute of limita-
tions, which was an attack on the technical integrity of the proceed-
ings, not an attack on the substantive ruling.107 Turning to the sub-
stance of Gonzalez’s rule 60(b) motion, the Court held that Gonzalez 
had not met the requirement of “a showing of ‘extraordinary circums-
tances.’ ”108 Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of 
Gonzalez’s motion.109
Day arose when a U.S. District Court dismissed a prisoner’s ha-
beas petition sua sponte.110 AEDPA sets a one-year statute of limita-
tions for filing federal habeas petitions.111 The one-year period begins 
on “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 
direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.”112
Petitioner Day was convicted of second-degree murder.113 A state 
court affirmed his sentence on appeal, and he did not appeal the deci-
sion to the United States Supreme Court.114 Day unsuccessfully 
sought state postconviction relief 353 days after his time for seeking 
direct review from the United States Supreme Court lapsed.115 Sub-
                                                                                                                    
 101. Id. at 527-28. 
 102. Id. at 528. 
 103. Id.
 104. Transcript of Oral Argument at 2, Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 524 (No. 04-6432), available 
at 2005 WL 1047257 [hereinafter Gonzalez OA Transcript]. An attorney from the U.S. Soli-
citor General’s Office also argued in support of Respondent. Id.
 105. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 530. 
 106. Id. at 532, 535-56. 
 107. Id.
 108. Id. at 536-38. 
 109. Id. at 544. 
 110. Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006). 
 111. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2000). 
 112. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
 113. Day, 547 U.S. at 203. 
 114. Id.
 115. Id.
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sequently, thirty-six days after being denied postconviction relief in 
state court, Day petitioned for federal habeas relief.116
 A magistrate judge found the petition to be proper and ordered the 
State to file its answer.117 The State calculated that Day’s petition 
had been filed after 352 days of untolled time, which fell within the 
one-year limit set by AEDPA.118 If the State had followed Eleventh 
Circuit instructions on computing elapsed time, it would have rea-
lized that over one year had passed—388 untolled days (352 plus 
36)—between the time Day’s conviction became final and his filing of 
the federal habeas petition.119
 Eventually, a newly assigned magistrate judge became aware of 
the miscalculation.120 Day’s petition was dismissed, and the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed the dismissal.121 The Unites States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to resolve “the division among the Circuits on the 
question whether a district court may dismiss a federal habeas peti-
tion as untimely under AEDPA, despite the State’s failure to raise 
the one-year limitation in its answer to the petition or its erroneous 
concession of the timeliness issue.”122
 Solicitor General Kise briefed and argued the case on behalf of the 
Interim Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections.123 The 
Court, in a five to four opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg,124 held 
that district courts could consider sua sponte the timeliness of habeas 
petitions filed by state prisoners; however, the courts would not be 
required to make this consideration.125 The Court affirmed the Ele-
venth Circuit's decision, and Solicitor General Kise was now two-for-
two on Florida cases before the Unites States Supreme Court. 
Lawrence, like Day, involved AEDPA’s one-year statute of limita-
tions. At issue was whether the limitation period was tolled while a 
petition for certiorari was pending in the United States Supreme 
Court.126 AEDPA provides that the statute of limitations is tolled 
                                                                                                                    
 116. Id.
 117. Id.
 118. Id.
 119. Id.
 120. Id. at 204. 
 121. Id.
 122. Id. at 205. 
 123. Transcript of Oral Argument, Day, 547 U.S. 198 (No. 05-8400), available at
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while an “application for State post-conviction or other collateral re-
view with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.”127
Petitioner Lawrence was convicted of several crimes, including first-
degree murder, and sentenced to death.128 He filed a petition for cer-
tiorari with the United States Supreme Court directly appealing his 
conviction and sentence.129 The Court denied the petition, and 365 
days later, Lawrence filed an application seeking state postconviction 
relief.130 Florida courts denied the postconviction application.131  Law-
rence then petitioned a second time for certiorari in the United 
States Supreme Court to review this denial of postconviction relief.132
While this second certiorari petition was pending, he filed a habeas 
petition in federal district court.133 The district court dismissed the 
petition as untimely under AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations 
since 364 days had lapsed before he filed the postconviction applica-
tion and an additional 113 days had lapsed since the Florida Su-
preme Court had affirmed the denial of his postconviction applica-
tion.134 The Supreme Court thus had to decide whether Lawrence’s 
second petition for certiorari had tolled AEDPA’s one-year period. 
 Kise, for a third time in eighteen months, represented the state 
before the United States Supreme Court135 (although this time, he 
was no longer appearing as Florida’s solicitor general because he had 
recently returned to private practice).136 The Court, in a five to four 
decision authored by Justice Thomas, agreed with Florida’s argu-
ment that the phrase “other collateral review” referred only to state 
reviews, a category under which petitions for certiorari before the 
United States Supreme Court do not fall.137 The Court then reviewed 
Lawrence’s equitable tolling claim and found that the requisite “ex-
traordinary circumstances” were not present.138 The Court affirmed 
the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit. Chris Kise had, in short order, 
won three consecutive cases before the United States Supreme Court 
and officially ended his tenure as Florida’s solicitor general on a very 
high note. Through his success with Gonzalez, Day, and Lawrence,
Kise helped further solidify the OSG as a key part to any high-level 
appeal handled by the state. 
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234 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:219 
 While these cases were not the high-profile, glamorous cases 
sometimes heard at the Supreme Court—Kise remembers that “the 
Anna Nicole Smith case” was argued at the Supreme Court the day 
after he argued Lawrence139—they were important cases in the sense 
that they affected important issues of comity and finality in relation 
to federal habeas review of state court decisions. 
 In addition to the trio of habeas corpus cases, the OSG handled a 
number of other important cases during Kise’s tenure. Although not 
successful in every case, the OSG further asserted itself as an active 
player in any high-stakes or high-profile appellate litigation involv-
ing a state or public interest. 
 In the realm of state constitutional law, litigation over the state’s 
Opportunity Scholarship Program extended from the Warner era into 
Kise’s tenure. Although the Florida Supreme Court ultimately ruled 
that the program violated the Florida Constitution, the OSG was an 
active force in the high-profile litigation.140
 With regard to election law, the OSG successfully defended the 
constitutionality of a state statute requiring a voter to be eligible and 
registered in the precinct in which he or she casts a provisional bal-
lot.141 In public records litigation, the OSG represented the Depart-
ment of Children and Families in a case involving a newspaper’s at-
tempt to gain access to confidential records maintained by the agen-
cy.142 The OSG also represented the state in a mandamus action 
brought to compel the city of Clearwater, Florida, to release emails 
sent to or from two city employees.143 Additionally, the office was  
involved in defending the constitutionality of the state’s Sexual  
Predators Act, which contains a sex offender registration and public  
notice requirement.144
 In federal courts, Kise represented the state as an intervening 
party in a suit brought by states and local governments challenging 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ allocation of reservoir water 
stored in Georgia’s Lake Lanier.145 Additionally, Kise worked with 
the Attorney General’s Office, along with thirteen public hospitals,  
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in bringing suit against a hospital for intentional inflation of  
service fees.146
 Chris Kise’s tenure as solicitor general was primarily important 
for two reasons. First, under his watch, the relatively new office over-
saw three successful appeals before the United States Supreme 
Court. Second, institutionally, Solicitor General Kise further demon-
strated that the role of solicitor general in Florida could be effective 
beyond its initially envisioned role of overseeing civil appeals—the of-
fice could play a major part in coordinating and heading up cases in 
any court, ranging from a state trial court to the United States  
Supreme Court. 
V.   SOLICITOR GENERAL SCOTT MAKAR: FOCUSING ON THE FUTURE
 Above current Solicitor General Scott Makar’s desk hangs a large, 
blown-up poster, which displays the following: “State Tax Provisions: 
The issuance, transfer, or exchange of a security, or the making or 
delivery of an instrument of transfer under a plan confirmed under 
section 1129 of this title, may not be taxed under any law imposing a 
stamp tax or similar tax.”147 When asked about this uncommon choice 
of office décor, Makar jokingly explained that it served as a constant 
reminder that an attorney never knows when an arcane provision of 
a little-known statute will trigger his or her dream case.148
 Since February 2007, Makar has served as solicitor general under 
Attorney General Bill McCollum.149 Prior to his appointment, Makar 
was chief of the appellate division for the Office of General Counsel 
for the consolidated City of Jacksonville from 2001-2007, and before 
that, a capital partner at Holland & Knight, where he worked from 
1989-2001.150 The federal statute decorating his wall was at issue in a 
2008 case, Florida Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, 
Inc.,151 which Makar successfully argued before the United States 
Supreme Court. As soon as Makar learned that he would be involved 
in the case before the nation’s highest appellate court, he had the sta-
tutory provision at issue blown-up and hung above his computer 
monitor in order to quickly memorize the language.152 It has hung 
there ever since. 
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 His tenure as solicitor general has been an active one. When Ma-
kar assumed the role, only one deputy solicitor general remained 
from Chris Kise’s team.153 Makar quickly had to restaff the office, be-
gin to brief cases, and handle requests to appear in oral arguments.154
In his time as solicitor general, Makar has handled a variety of cases 
in a range of jurisdictions. In only a six-month span, Makar argued 
cases before the Second Circuit in and for Leon County (the seat of 
Florida’s government), the First District Court of Appeal of Florida, 
the Florida Supreme Court, the U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, and the United States Supreme Court.155 This experience was 
yet another example of why the role of solicitor general lives up to 
Warner’s label of “the greatest job.”156
A. Notable Cases Under Makar 
 Just over two years into Makar’s tenure, the OSG already has 
participated in numerous cases implicating a variety of state and 
public interests.  
 In the area of constitutional law, the office has addressed cases 
involving individual and property rights. In Frazier ex rel. Frazier v. 
Winn, a high school student challenged the facial constitutionality of 
Florida’s Pledge of Allegiance statute, section 1003.44(1), Florida 
Statutes.157 On behalf of the Florida Department of Education and 
the State Board of Education, the OSG appealed the district court’s 
decision, which found the statute unconstitutional.158 Specifically, the 
district court held that the statute was facially unconstitutional be-
cause 1) it required parental consent to be excused from reciting the 
pledge, which “rob[bed] the student of the right to make an indepen-
dent decision whether to say the pledge,” and 2) it required an ex-
cused student to stand during the pledge.159 On appeal, the Eleventh 
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Circuit reversed in part, concluding that the interest of the State in 
protecting a parent’s right to control a child’s upbringing outweighed 
the infringement on the students’ First Amendment rights.160 The 
court also held that the provision requiring a student to stand at at-
tention during the pledge’s recitation, even if the parents consented 
to the student’s non-participation, was unconstitutional, and severed 
that portion of the statute.161
 In the area of property rights, the office represented the Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection in its appeal to the Florida Su-
preme Court in Florida Department of Environmental Protection v. 
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.162 At issue was the constitutio-
nality of provisions of the Beach and Shore Preservation Act, which 
provide for the establishment of an erosion control line in beach re-
nourishment projects.163 This line becomes the boundary between 
publicly owned land and privately owned upland.164 An association of 
six beachfront property owners challenged the Act, arguing that it 
resulted in an unconstitutional taking of upland owners’ littoral 
rights to receive accretions and to maintain direct contact with the 
water.165 The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the Act did not 
create an unconstitutional taking, and the Act effectuated the State’s 
constitutional duty to protect Florida’s beaches in a way that reason-
ably balanced public and private interests.166 The United States Su-
preme Court granted review in the case, which presents the question 
of whether the Florida Supreme Court’s decision is a “judicial tak-
ing.”167 The case will be heard in the Court’s 2009-2010 Term. 
 The OSG also has handled cases involving the administration of 
justice in Florida. In one such case, Floridians for a Level Playing 
Field v. Floridians Against Expanded Gambling, the office 
represented the Department of State in a challenge involving alleged 
fraud in the signature-gathering process for a citizens’ constitutional 
amendment ballot initiative.168 The case was appealed from the First 
District Court of Appeal, which heard the case en banc before twelve 
of the court’s fifteen judges.169 In the en banc opinions, six of the 
judges concurred in certifying the case to the Florida Supreme Court 
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as raising a question of great public importance.170 Interestingly, this 
triggered a question of whether the Florida Supreme Court had dis-
cretionary jurisdiction to hear the case.171 The Florida Supreme Court 
agreed with the OSG’s argument that the Court lacked jurisdiction 
since the six judges did not create a majority of the twelve-judge pan-
el, as is required to establish certified question jurisdiction under Ar-
ticle V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution.172
 In the area of government structure and functions, the Solicitor 
General has handled numerous cases addressing the role and limits 
of various governmental bodies. In a pair of cases—Ford v. Brown-
ing173 and Florida Department of State v. Slough174—the OSG de-
fended the constitutionality of amendments proposed by the Taxation 
and Budget Reform Commission.175 In Ford, the Florida Supreme 
Court concluded that the Commission exceeded its authority to pro-
pose constitutional amendments dealing with taxation or the state 
budgetary process by proposing revisions to the freedom of religion and 
public education provisions in the Florida Constitution.176 In Slough,
the Court concluded that the ballot title and summary for a proposed 
amendment addressing ad valorem taxes were misleading.177
 Under Solicitor General Makar, the office has continued the tradi-
tion of handling cases at the trial level. In Hersh v. Browning, on a 
motion for summary judgment, the OSG successfully argued that the 
Legislature had the power to limit local government authority to levy 
ad valorem taxes.178 However, the trial court also concluded that the 
ballot summary for an amendment proposed by Senate Joint Resolu-
tion 4-B relating to the Florida “Save Our Homes” provision was mis-
leading and could not be placed on the ballot.179 The State’s appeal of 
the latter holding was voluntarily dismissed.180
 Another highlight of Makar’s tenure has been Florida Department 
of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., which he successfully argued 
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before the United States Supreme Court.181 On behalf of the Florida 
Department of Revenue, Makar argued that a federal statute provid-
ing for a stamp-tax exemption did not apply to transferred assets un-
der a bankruptcy plan that was not confirmed until after the transfer 
was made.182 The federal Bankruptcy Code provides an exemption for 
any asset transfer “under a plan confirmed under [Chapter 11]” of 
the Code.183 The Supreme Court acknowledged that Florida’s reading 
of the statute was the most natural—the word “confirmed” is a past 
participle and that “a transfer made prior to the date of plan confir-
mation cannot be subject to, or under the authority of, something 
that did not exist at the time of the transfer–a confirmed plan.”184
The Court also determined that this reading was consistent with the 
context of the statute and the Court’s obligation to construe the  
exemption narrowly.185
 In addition to briefing and arguing cases, the office has actively 
engaged in cases via the filing of amicus briefs. In Strand v. Escam-
bia County, the Florida Supreme Court receded from its own 
precedent and held that, under the state constitution, Escambia 
County could not pledge tax increments for repayment of bonds with-
out approval of the electorate by referendum.186 Subsequently, the 
OSG filed an amicus brief, asserting that the Court should clarify its 
decision because the change of law “potentially affect[ed] billions of 
dollars in existing construction projects financed with bonds that, al-
though validly issued under prior law, [were] not explicitly included 
in the Court’s statement.”187 The Court thereafter revised its opinion 
and affirmed its precedent, holding that the bonds could be validated 
without a referendum.188
 More recently, in Department of Children and Family Services v. 
Chapman, the OSG submitted an amicus brief to the Second District 
Court of Appeal on behalf of the State of Florida in support of DCF as 
to whether the state agency was liable for the criminal acts of its li-
censee, a substance abuse counselor.189 The amicus brief argued that a 
decision holding a state agency liable would expand the duty of care 
owed by a governmental entity beyond what Florida tort law allows.190
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The Second District agreed and concluded that DCF did not owe a duty 
of care in tort to individual members of the general public.191
 The OSG has likewise continued to take the lead in amicus efforts 
before the United States Supreme Court. In Arizona v. Gant, the 
OSG submitted an amicus brief joined by twenty-four states.192 The 
brief asserted the states’ interests in the Court’s adherence to its 
precedent regarding warrantless searches of vehicles incident to ar-
rest.193 Although the states’ position did not prevail,194 Florida’s  
amicus effort was notable for the amount of states that joined in  
the brief. 
 In Rivera v. Illinois, the Supreme Court addressed whether the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required automat-
ic reversal of a defendant’s conviction where a trial court erroneously 
denied the defendant’s peremptory challenge to the seating of a ju-
ror.195 Again, Florida’s OSG filed an amicus brief joined by a sizeable 
amount of states—twenty-nine—which urged the Court to find that 
such an error did not require overturning the conviction.196 The Court 
ruled that the conviction would stand: “[b]ecause peremptory chal-
lenges are within the States’ province to grant or withhold, the mis-
taken denial of a state-provided peremptory challenge does not, with-
out more, violate the Federal Constitution.”197
 A third notable amicus effort by the OSG was in Bartlett v. Strick-
land, which required the Court to interpret a section of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965.198 The OSG filed an amicus brief on behalf of the 
Florida House of Representatives, arguing for the Court’s affirmance 
of the North Carolina Supreme Court’s holding that a minority group 
must show that it makes up a numerical majority of the voting-age 
population to state a claim under section two of the Voting Rights 
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Act.199 The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the North Carolina 
court’s ruling.200
 On the horizon, as of August 2009, the OSG is handling three cas-
es before the United States Supreme Court in its 2009-2010 term. 
Along with Stop the Beach Renourishment, the office will represent 
the state in Graham v. Florida201 and Sullivan v. Florida,202 a pair of 
cases involving issues related to the constitutionality of sentencing a 
juvenile to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the 
commission of a non-homicide crime. 
 Under Makar, the OSG continues to engage in strong advocacy for 
the State of Florida and its citizens. Like Warner and Kise, Makar’s 
time as solicitor general has placed him at the helm of many high-
profile and significant cases, including Piccadilly, which was Makar’s 
first oral argument before the United States Supreme Court. Makar 
aptly describes the OSG as the state’s most high-powered public law 
firm.203 In the past decade, it has been involved with an array of com-
plex and critical cases involving the state’s interests. Looking for-
ward to the next decade and beyond, the OSG can even further de-
velop as the top appellate litigation resource for the state. 
VI.   THE FUTURE OF FLORIDA’S OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
 The past ten years have witnessed the creation and development 
of Florida’s OSG. At this tenth anniversary benchmark, it is impor-
tant to reflect on what can be gleaned from the past decade and look 
forward to further developing the potential of the OSG. 
 Since July 1999, the office has grown into what it was originally 
envisioned as—a high-powered, appellate-focused unit within the At-
torney General’s Office that supervises all civil appeals. In just the 
handful of cases this Article has covered, it is undeniable that the 
OSG has played a key role in explaining and advocating the state 
and public interests at issue. Although the office does not win every 
case, its presence as a party or amicus curiae ensures that the judi-
cial body charged with resolving the case is exposed to the state’s 
perspective on how the area of law at issue functions and what im-
pact the court’s decision might have, not only in the case at hand, but 
in subsequent cases. 
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 There are concrete benefits to having a state solicitor general.204
First, appellate law and practice requires its own skill set—this in-
cludes not only familiarity with brief writing and oral arguments, but 
an awareness of rules of appellate procedure, state appellate jurisdic-
tion, and other niche legal concepts. By attracting active and skilled 
appellate lawyers from all experience levels, the OSG employs a staff 
of lawyers capable of handling a variety of appellate work in all  
jurisdictions, from the trial level to the highest appellate court in  
the nation. 
 Second, because the office represents the state’s interests, it can 
take a broad approach to a case rather than just looking at the nar-
row interests presented in a particular case. This is important in de-
ciding when to appeal a case, or—equally important—when not to 
appeal a case. It also provides flexibility that allows the office to ad-
vance only those arguments that are deemed important versus rais-
ing every conceivable issue. Further, in supervising all civil appeals 
cases, the Solicitor General can assist the Attorney General in ensur-
ing that the state is taking consistent positions in a range of cases 
throughout the entire state.  
 Third, the office is available to handle any critical cases that may 
arise. By having a unit solely devoted to appellate work, the Attorney 
General’s Office has the resources necessary to engage in expedited 
or complex appellate litigation. 
 Lastly, as Makar has noted, the office has an overriding objective 
of building and maintaining its reputation among any courts in 
which the office appears.205 From Makar’s perspective, the office is 
not just another law firm that can be hired to handle an appeal; the 
“office has a higher duty to the state, its [citizens], and agencies to 
not merely advance a political, agenda-driven position.”206 To meet 
this reputational goal, the office is driven to be thorough and accu-
rate as well as having a broad perspective on the development and 
direction of the law.207 Under Makar, the office has a “judicial” mind-
set, reflected in its structure (all new deputy solicitors general  
have judicial clerkship experience), process (thirty-page limit on 
briefs whenever feasible), and public service (deputies are strongly 
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encouraged to publish, teach, and participate in appellate CLE and 
bar functions).208
 Looking forward to the next ten years and beyond, there are two 
main avenues the State of Florida might pursue in further develop-
ing and strengthening the role of solicitor general. First, considera-
tion should be given to expanding the formal scope of the position to 
supervise not only all civil appeals within the Attorney General’s Of-
fice, but also all criminal appeals so that all appeals handled by the 
Attorney General’s Office are reviewed by the OSG. This approach, 
used in the State of Texas with its solicitor general,209 would unify 
the strengths of the criminal appeals division with the resources of 
the OSG. Additionally, such a change would promote consistency and 
further ensure that the criminal appeals division was bolstered with 
appellate support in any significant or critical cases. However, a 
downside is that the criminal appeals division has more than 100 ap-
pellate attorneys litigating over 10,000 cases a year.210 The day-to-
day oversight of such a large staff would be daunting and could dilute 
the primary role of the OSG. As an alternative, the scope of the posi-
tion might be formalized to reflect the general current practice of the 
OSG having primary responsibility for all appeals and amicus mat-
ters, civil or criminal, before the United States Supreme Court (ex-
cluding capital appeals, which involve highly specialized issues). 
 Second, similar to the relationship between the United States Su-
preme Court and U.S. Solicitor General, the Florida Supreme Court 
should view Florida’s Solicitor General as a resource when cases 
arise that implicate public or state interests. To further the relation-
ship, the Florida Supreme Court should consider inviting the Solici-
tor General to file jurisdictional briefs or memoranda of law in cases 
in which the State is not a party but may have some interest. This 
would ensure that the State has a voice in all significant cases and, 
in some cases, could assist the Supreme Court in deciding whether to 
exercise its discretionary jurisdiction.  
 As a model of this practice, the United States Supreme Court regu-
larly issues orders which “call[] for the views of the United States Soli-
citor General” (CVSG).211 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Ohio has a 
rule addressing when that court may invite the state solicitor general 
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to express the views of the state before a determination of jurisdiction 
is made.212 Additionally, the Texas Supreme Court has begun to issue 
formal CVSG’s, doing so for the first time in December 2008.213
 Although the OSG has flourished in its first decade of existence, 
as these two suggestions indicate, it has the potential to develop even 
further as an advocate for the state and its citizens. 
VII.   CONCLUSION
 From the minds and efforts of D’Alemberte and Butterworth to 
the challenges and successes faced by the first three solicitors general 
of Florida, the OSG has had a unique and active first decade. As an-
ticipated by Warner in his 2001 article on the role of Florida’s solici-
tor general, the OSG has come to represent an appellate lawyer’s 
dream job—it provides an opportunity for lawyers to “use [their] 
skills and experience . . . to work on Florida’s most interesting and 
challenging cases, and to participate in the legal and policy decisions 
regarding important issues to Florida and the nation . . . .”214 Now on 
the threshold of its second decade, the OSG is poised to continue its 
strong and vital advocacy on behalf of the state and its citizens.  
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